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Abstract 
Recent characterisations of the Australian Labor Party as a ‘cartel party’ 
suggest that there was, after the 1970s, a fundamental discontinuity in 
Labor’s history. We assess this contention not only in terms of the ALP’s 
policies but also the mechanisms which link it with different classes and 
social groups: Labor’s electoral support, membership and local branches, 
the backgrounds of the Party’s parliamentarians and leaders, the role of 
trade unions inside the ALP, and its sources of funding. While there have 
been some quantitative changes in these characteristics, we conclude that 
Labor remains, on balance, a ‘capitalist workers party.’ 
 
Introduction 
During the 1980s and 1990s critics of the contemporary ALP, such as Graham 
Maddox and Tim Battin, argued that an important break with the Party’s socialist 
tradition had recently taken place. They focussed particularly on Labor Party policy 
and actions in government (Maddox 1989; Maddox and Battin 1991, 181–96).1 This 
theme has been taken up by contributors to a 2006 book on the evolution of political 
parties in Australia, Political parties in transition? (Marsh 2006a). Drawing on Katz, 
Mair and Blyth’s conceptions of cartel parties, convergent in their policies and reliant 
on state funding (Katz and Mair 1995, 5–28; Blyth and Katz 2005, 33–66), these 
writers argued that Labor can now be described as a cartel party. While Maddox and 
Battin argued that  
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Labor’s embrace of economic rationalism/neo-liberalism represented a major 
departure from the Party’s traditional ideology, according to Ian Marsh there was 
‘convergence in policy agendas’ between the ALP and the Liberal Party (Marsh 
2006c, 126). But the Australian explorers of the concept of a cartel party rest their 
case not only on examinations of Labor policy, the focus of Maddox and Battin, but 
also on significant shifts in Labor’s electoral support, membership and sources of 
funds. Gary Johns, for example, concluded that ‘the Australian case is one where 
major parties have lost their party base,’ and Ian Ward that ‘the Labor and Liberal 
parties [are] now without firm foundations in civil society.’ According to Marsh, ‘major 
party organisations have largely jettisoned interest aggregation. Established 
organisational linkages—the trade unions with Labor and business with the 
Liberals—[have] weakened’ (Johns 2006, 66; Marsh 2006c, 131, 135–7; Ward 2006, 
89; also see Marsh 2006b, 13). 
The purpose of this article is to consider claims that there has been a major 
shift—the ‘discontinuity thesis’—in the recent history of the Labor Party. It is 
necessary first to determine what the Party has been, in other words the nature of its 
material constitution, until the 1960s. We argue that the ALP has been a capitalist 
workers party. We then examine what has happened to those features of the Party 
which identified it as ‘capitalist’ and those that made it distinctively ‘labour’. Has there 
been a transformation in Labor’s relations with different classes and social groups? 
In the second part of the article, we assess the argument that there has been a 
discontinuity in Labor’s policies and practice. We argue that, far from a fundamental 
break, there has been an underlying thematic continuity, in this respect, over the 
past century and longer. Labor was, and remains, a party that seeks to shape the 
capitalist state and capitalist economy in order to secure the process of capital 
accumulation. Continuity does not mean, however, that the Party’s policies and 
practices have not changed over time. We use a case study of industrial relations 
under Gough Whitlam, Bob Hawke, Paul Keating and Kevin Rudd to illustrate some 
important changes. However, we argue that these changes did not result from an 
alleged ‘betrayal’ of a tradition, a key theme of the ‘discontinuity thesis,’ but the 
interplay of the various forces that make up Labor’s material constitution. We 
conclude with a summary of our case. 
 
Labor’s Material Constitution 
Australian socialist W. R. Winspeare argued, in 1915, that capitalists could benefit 
from Labor’s ability to attract workers’ support for policies contrary to working class 
interests (Winspeare 1914, 9–10, 22, 24, 37, 39, 45). In a similar vein, Lenin 
characterised the Australian Labor Party as a ‘liberal labour party,’ ‘the unalloyed 
representative of the non-socialist workers’ trade unions’ whose officials also led the 
party (Lenin 1977, 216–17). From this perspective, the ALP was a capitalist workers 
organisation. A workers party, in that it was established by the trade unions and the 
working class formed its most solid base of mass support. This evidently 
distinguished Labor from its conservative rivals. It was a capitalist party, because its 
project was to manage the capitalist state and economy, not to overthrow or 
profoundly change them. Labor was, 
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then, a capitalist workers party, rather than a socialist workers party because of the 
class interests of those who led and controlled it—the trade union and 
parliamentary leaders. 
As Lenin put it of the British Labour Party, 
[W]hether or not a party is really a political party of the workers does not depend 
solely upon a membership of workers but also upon the men that lead it, and the 
content of its actions and its political tactics. Only this latter determines whether we 
really have before us a political party of the proletariat (Lenin 1920; also see Lenin 
1916). 
The class position of top trade union officials is determined by the function of 
trade unions in capitalist society (Hyman 1971; Cliff and Gluckstein 1988; Kelly 
1988). The purpose of unions is to improve the terms on which labour power is 
exploited, not to overcome exploitation itself. The job of union officials is to act as 
bargaining agents; to secure the best wages and conditions for workers. Their job is 
routinised, and the negotiations and the union become ends in themselves, rather 
than means to an end. Union leaders attempt to gain benefits for workers but they 
also seek to moderate working class demands to levels capitalists find acceptable, 
even if disagreeable. As has been established since the early writing of Sidney and 
Beatrice Webb, full-time trade union officials experience rather different working and 
life circumstances to the workers by whom they are elected or they are appointed to 
serve (Webb and Webb 1911). They are not exploited by an employer and they lead 
a relatively privileged lifestyle compared with the mass of their members. In playing 
their negotiating role, union officials come under pressure not just from members but 
from employers and the state. Don Rawson commented in 1966, ‘[s]ince the work by 
which they will be judged consists of trying to improve conditions under the existing, 
capitalist system it is not surprising that union officials have usually been reformist 
rather than revolutionary’ (Rawson 1966, 14). They use their position in the ALP to 
further their interests as a social group, and these interests are fundamentally 
procapitalist. 
Its parliamentary leaders reinforced the reformist rather than the revolutionary 
orientation of the ALP. Like union officials, Labor politicians mediated between 
workers and the capitalists. But they performed this function at one further remove 
from direct struggles at the point of production. Like union officials their electoral 
work—canvassing support for Party preselection, doorknocking or speaking at public 
meetings—brought them into periodic contact with workers. But their normal routine 
did not involve relating to workers as workers: reporting to them at strike meetings or 
visiting workplaces to recruit to a union. Unlike union officials, therefore, Labor 
politicians rarely interacted with workers in forums where they could be disciplined. 
They were therefore even less subject to control by rank and file workers than union 
leaders. 
Further, Labor politicians, unlike union leaders, were at times called upon to run 
the capitalist state which integrated them even further into the system. When in office 
Labor leaders have a responsibility to oversee some of the key elements of the state 
machine which they share with other senior public officials, for example, the heads of 
the public service and Reserve Bank, the military chiefs of staff, and the judges of 
the High Court (Kuhn 2005). These arms of the 
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capitalist state were capable of reining in Labor leaders if their programs, while by no 
means radical, stepped too far beyond the parameters of what the capitalists of the 
day were prepared to accept. Jack Lang discovered this when he was dismissed by 
the Governor of NSW in 1932. Rather than challenge undemocratic bastions of 
authority, Labor politicians have in most cases bowed down before them. The 
personal benefits they enjoyed, in the form of high salaries, perks and pensions, 
reinforced a preference for gradualism and incorporation rather than radicalism. 
Contradictory features of working class experience and consciousness2 made a 
stable Party possible, despite the fact that Labor’s leadership pursued policies 
contrary to the long-term class interests of its base. 
On the one hand, the material reality of working class life and, in particular the 
exploitation that workers experience, can breed a basic sense of class identification. 
This is most apparent when exploitation drives workers to fight, evident in recurrent 
strike waves throughout the 20th century. The forms that working class self-
identification take are varied. They can be relatively diffuse like disengagement at 
work, which is the norm (Moullakis 2005); support for particular football codes and 
teams; attendance at certain schools; and identification with specific religions. But 
they can also be more explicit and active, most obviously in episodes of industrial 
militancy and membership of trade unions. Between 1920 and 1980 approximately 
one half of the Australian work force were members of trade unions. In areas of blue 
collar employment the figure was closer to 75%. Support for the Labor Party is best 
understood as another element of working class identity. 
On the other hand, subordination to employers inculcates feelings of 
powerlessness, submission, adaptation to capitalist norms and a belief in the 
apparent ‘imperatives’ of the system: the sanctity of profits, national defence and 
international competition. While exploitation leads to a desire for justice, 
powerlessness breeds the belief that workers cannot win justice by their own actions 
and must rely on an arm of the state, in other words a strategy of parliamentary 
reform. Working class support for Labor, regardless of its record in office, was 
therefore reproduced by this mixed consciousness. Labor in turn moulded this 
outlook to promote nationalism. 
In summary, Labor’s material constitution, its character as a capitalist workers 
party, was founded on its ambition to manage the capitalist state while resting on a 
base of working class votes and trade union affiliation. Its leading personnel were 
trade union leaders and parliamentary representatives who depended on support 
from the working class but were not working class themselves. Their orientation was 
to improve the lot of the working class within the capitalist system not to challenge it 
fundamentally. 
Has Labor’s material constitution, outlined above, been transformed in recent 
decades, as the cartel thesis suggests, or is it still essentially intact? The following 
sections consider in turn, the class basis of the ALP’s electoral support, its 
membership, its leadership, its relationship with the trade unions, and its finances. 
 
 
 
2 The dual and contradictory nature of working class consciousness is explored by Gramsci (1971, 
333) and Lukács (1971). 
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Electoral Support 
A variety of indicators confirm that Labor’s support base still rests predominantly in 
the working class. Although a majority of workers don’t always vote Labor, workers 
are still over-represented among Labor voters. At the 2004 federal election, nearly 
59% of Labor’s vote came from people who can be identified by their occupations as 
working class (calculated from Bean et al. 2004), as compared with only 43% of the 
Coalition’s. On average, nearly two-thirds of trade unionists (63%) voted Labor in the 
11 federal elections between 1966 and 2004 (Leigh 2006, 541). 
Despite these facts, however, Labor’s bedrock electoral support among the 
working class has clearly been declining. In 1987, 59% of manual workers supported 
Labor. By 2004 this figure had fallen to a record low of 42%. Fortynine per cent of 
non-supervisory employees voted for Labor in 1987, only 39% in 2004 (Scott 2006, 
3). Labor can no longer rely on a case-hardened primary vote of 45% plus in the way 
it once could. In 2007, when Labor won office for the seventh time in its history, it did 
so with a primary vote of 43%. On every previous occasion it had polled between 48 
and 50%. 
 
Membership 
Labor’s individual (as opposed to union affiliate) membership has been declining 
over a long period. In 1954, just before the DLP split, Labor had 75,000 individual 
members (Scott 1991, 30). By 2006, membership had fallen to 40,000, while 
population had doubled (Ray 2006). Recent efforts to stem the decline have not had 
any notable success. In 2000, the NSW branch, which claimed 21,500 members, 
launched a membership drive with a target of 50,000 by 2005. Instead, the 
membership fell to 16,300 (Ramsey 2005). 
The composition of the Party has been undergoing long-term change. The most 
dramatic shift has been the decline in blue-collar members who made up 46% of the 
NSW ALP’s membership in 1961. By 1981 the figure had fallen by more than half to 
21%, a far more dramatic decline than the fall in the blue collar proportion of the 
workforce. For a period in the 1960s through to the 1980s, the decline in blue-collar 
worker members was offset by an influx of higher level white-collar professionals, 
managers and administrators, in many cases former students who were attracted to 
the Party on the basis of its opposition to the Vietnam war, racism and sexism. 
However, the Hawke and Keating Governments’ record on a range of social justice 
issues in the 1980s and 1990s demoralised many of this cohort, leading to a 
significant loss of members (Scott 1991, 25, 37–38, 46; also see Ward 1989, 175–
84). 
In contrast, there have been two groups whose weight in the Party has grown. 
The first is the layer of Party and union functionaries, their personal supporters and 
aspirants to such posts (Cavalier 2005). The second layer is retirees. Between the 
early 1960s and the 1980s, the proportion of those signed up as retirees in the Party 
rose significantly and, in 2006, the average age of members in the NSW branch was 
60 (Davies 2006). 
The decline in the ALP’s membership has affected its organisation on the 
ground. Where once Labor had a base of members in the bigger workplaces 
who could be relied upon to champion Labor’s cause, this layer has now 
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vanished. Former NSW minister Rodney Cavalier estimated in 2005 that the NSW 
branch had only 1,000 active members outside the apparatus and ‘[t]he Labor Party 
has ceased to exist below’ (Cavalier 2005). In 2005, Mark Latham estimated that the 
active membership was 7,500 nationally and suggested that the Party had become 
‘a virtual party controlled by a handful of machine men’ (Latham 2005a, 185; Latham 
2005b; also see Button 2002; Ray 2006). 
 
Leadership 
The decline in Labor’s working class membership is magnified among the Party’s 
parliamentarians. Until the election of Gough Whitlam in 1967, all national Labor 
Party leaders, apart from Bert Evatt, had experience as workers before entering 
Parliament. Even Evatt came from a working class family. 
The election of Whitlam marked the advent of a new generation of Labor 
leaders. Whitlam’s father was the Commonwealth Crown Solicitor and he himself 
had been a barrister. Of subsequent Labor leaders only Bill Hayden, who was a 
police officer before becoming an MP, had sustained experience in anything 
approximating a working class job. 
The changes in the background of leaders were mirrored in the parliamentary 
caucus. In 1901, 63% of Labor members of the House of Representatives and 
Senate had blue-collar backgrounds. Forty years later the figure had fallen to 39%. 
By 1981, the figure was down to 12% (Crisp and Atkinson 1981, 57). Table 1, which 
reports only the job held immediately prior to entering Parliament, indicates the 
dominant trend of the past two decades: the rapid increase in the proportion of 
politicians whose immediate prior occupation was in the Party or union apparatus. 
This category includes State politician, ‘adviser, consultant, lobbyist,’ ‘party and 
union administrator,’ ‘party and union official,’ and ‘researchers, research assistants, 
electoral and project officers.’ 
The current life experience of Labor MPs is hardly likely to give them insights 
into workers’ lives. It has become very difficult for Labor voters to engage with their 
elected representatives unbuffered by minders and spin-doctors. Fiveminute 
shopping mall walk-throughs and community cabinets have become Labor leaders’ 
preferred method of ‘meeting the people.’ The distancing is not 
 
Table 1. Previous Occupations of ALP Federal MPs Immediately Before Entering Parliament, 
1971–2005 
 1971  1983  1993  2002  2005 
 N % N % N % N % N % 
Bluecollar 5 6 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Lower white collar 5 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Higher white collar or professional 34 40 58 55 48 44 19 20 17 19 
Party and union apparatus 21 24 22 21 47 43 65 70 59 67 
Business 9 11 13 10 14 13 9 10 12 14 
Other 12 14 10 12 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Total 86 100 105 100 110 100 93 100 88 100 
Percentages may not sum to 100, due to rounding. Source for raw data: Commonwealth 
Parliamentary Handbooks (1971, 1983, 1993, 2002, 2005). 
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just physical but financial. Even the most junior federal MP was paid $2436 per 
week, in 2007–2008, equivalent to more than double average weekly earnings for 
full-time adult employees ($1173). The Prime Minister’s weekly salary was $6334, 
well over five times average earnings (ABS 2008; Remuneration Tribunal 2007; 
Remuneration Tribunal 2008). 
The high salaries of Labor politicians reinforce their integration into 
establishment circles. They are commonly guests at society weddings, private 
sporting events, charity lunches, and birthday or retirement celebrations for high 
profile business people. Prime Minister Kevin Rudd’s relationship with the private 
capitalist class has been particularly intimate. His wife, Therese Rein, is the 
millionaire CEO of a large job placement agency which benefited from John 
Howard’s privatisation of employment services.3 Many Labor politicians also have 
direct and personal business interests. While this is not a new phenomenon (see, 
barely fictionalised, Hardy 1951), the current degree of business involvement of 
Labor politicians is unprecedented in its scope . On retirement, senior Labor 
politicians commonly join boards in both the public and private sectors or are 
appointed as consultants for property development and infrastructure companies 
seeking to win government favours (Higgins and Newman 2005; McCullough 2005). 
 
Relationship with the Trade Unions 
Labor’s relationship with the trade unions is undergoing some important changes. As 
unions have lost members since the 1980s, the hold of the union leaders on the 
Party has come under attack. Leading members have been among the most 
prominent in calling for a reduction or elimination of the role of unions in the ALP 
(Grattan 2000; Button 2002). In 2002 the 60:40 ratio of union delegates to delegates 
representing individual members at most State ALP conferences was changed to 
50:50. In March 2008, the Labor Caucus changed its rules to give the Prime Minister 
the right to select members of Cabinet, dropping the traditional practice by which the 
Caucus and hence the factions, vehicles of union influence, decided on the ministry 
(Norington 2007; Ramsey 2008). 
Union power within the Party was historically premised on the fact that they 
provided the bulk of the Party’s funds, traditionally up to 80% of the total. In recent 
years the figure has been in steep decline. In 2005, according to former Senator 
Robert Ray, unions contributed only 15% (Ray 2006). 
These are notable and significant changes. They do not, however, constitute a 
qualitative change in the character of the Party. Union officials remain structurally 
embedded within the Labor Party. The power that union officials can still wield within 
the Party was a crucial factor in the May 2008 conference defeat of the NSW 
parliamentary leadership over the Government’s proposal to sell off the State’s 
electricity system and an important element in the complex events that eventually led 
his own right-wing faction to force Premier Morris Iemma to resign in September 
(Mitchell 2008; Ong 2008; Patty 2008). Further, although the relative financial 
contribution of the unions has fallen, the 
 
 
 
3 Although Ms Rein subsequently divested herself of her Australian investments prior to the 2007 
election, she retained significant investments in her company’s operations in the UK. 
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amounts involved are still substantial. In the 2000s, the federal Party continued to 
receive an average of about $5 million annually from the unions and substantially 
more in election years. In the run-up to the 2007 federal election, moreover, unions 
donated millions of dollars and mobilised thousands of union members to campaign 
directly for an ALP victory through their ‘Your Rights at Work’ campaign (Loughnane 
2007). Union contributions to the State branches are at least as significant. 
Furthermore, unions continue to provide a stream of parliamentary candidates, the 
most prominent of whom went straight into the Rudd Cabinet. 
The relationship with the trade unions is therefore in flux. There are elements of 
continuity, elements of change. This greater complexity is illustrated by recent 
debates in the ALP about industrial relations (discussed below). 
 
Finances 
As proponents of the cartel party analysis stress, the relative decline of union funding 
for the Party is an indication of important changes afoot—the increasing dependence 
by the Party on funding by the state and by big business (Johns 2006, 51). 
State funding for political parties is a relatively recent phenomenon and takes 
several forms. First, there are direct grants by State and federal governments to 
cover election costs on the basis of the number of votes that a Party receives (Young 
2006, 38). In NSW parties also receive the equivalent of domestic postage for a letter 
every year for each vote cast in the previous election. The total amounts received by 
the Party through these avenues are substantial—at the 2007 federal election, the 
ALP received $22 million (AEC 2008). Other subsidies include public funding of 
Party-aligned research centres (initiated by the Keating Government) and 
international activities, tax deductions for donations to the Party, and free election 
broadcasts on ABC and SBS television and radio (Young 2006, 42, 49–50). 
The Labor Party also receives state funding indirectly through parliamentarians’ 
salaries and allowances. Parliamentarians receive a host of financial benefits, 
including, at the federal level: uncapped travel, telephone and photocopy allowances 
plus annual subsidies for printing, postal, and electorate costs. Further assistance 
comes in the form of salaries and travel expenses for Labor parliamentarians’ and 
ministers’ staffers; ‘a couple of thousand’ of them at State and federal levels by 
2006, according to Senator Robert Ray (Ray 2006; Young 2006, 52–9). 
Business funding now makes up a large slice of Labor income, accounting for at 
least 23% of Party funds in 2001–2002. Donations from business are particularly 
evident at the State level where hospitality, property development, and media 
companies—all dependent on government favours—are major contributors to Party 
funds (AEC 2003). With money comes influence. In 2008 the NSW ALP offered 
‘Foundation Partners’ who donated $110,000 to the Party a package that included a 
private ‘lunch with senior ministers’ and a ‘welcome lunch’ with the State Premier and 
Treasurer (West 2008). Business is now integrated into the highest levels of the 
Party’s operations, with the Rudd Government establishing a Business Advisory 
Council in March 2008 which included senior executives from Rio Tinto and News 
Corporation. 
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Policies 
Thus far our analysis of the ALP has focused on the Party’s material constitution. 
What of the second element of alleged discontinuity in the Labor Party’s recent 
history—its policies and practice? Does Labor’s embrace of neoliberalism in the 
1980s represent a qualitative break from its (allegedly) left-wing or reformist past, as 
Maddox and Battin argue? While it is true that Labor’s adoption of neo-liberal policies 
did represent an important shift, there has been an underlying thematic continuity–
Labor’s willingness, although not without occasional faction fights and internal 
dissent, to pursue the policies of economic orthodoxy prevailing at particular phases 
of Australian capitalist development. In its embrace of the prevailing economic 
orthodoxy, Labor has had more in common with its conservative opponents than 
differences. 
This does not mean that at particular moments, or even during whole periods, 
Labor’s policies were identical to the conservatives’. Until the 1980s, Labor had a 
more expansive approach to the welfare state and was generally more eager to use 
state-owned enterprises in the pursuit of national development. The Chifley 
Government’s attempt to nationalise the banks in 1948 epitomised the Party’s 
greater faith in state intervention and state-run activities. Labor has been more 
inclined to see the regulation of prices as an effective tool of economic management, 
initiating unsuccessful referenda in 1948 and 1973 to give the Commonwealth 
substantive powers in this area. Moreover, in the field of industrial relations, most 
evidently during the late 1920s and again in the late 1970s, there have been 
significant differences between the major parties’ policies.4 
While important, these policy differences do not disguise the basic agreement 
between Labor and the main conservative party about the broad policies necessary 
to achieve prosperity in Australia, even if both sides had an interest in rhetorically 
magnifying their disagreements about details. After Federation both Labor and the 
conservatives shared a common programme of tariff protection to foster the 
development of manufacturing industry (Kuhn 1988, 123–36). During the depression 
of the 1930s, the ALP split and the federal and NSW governments fell. However, all 
of the Labor administrations, including Jack Lang’s—the most radical—agreed to 
policies of fiscal retrenchment (Clark 1977, 148). In the 1930s and 1940s, 
Keynesianism became the orthodoxy of the economics profession, and Labor soon 
embraced it too, as did the Menzies Government that followed. Chifley’s attempt to 
nationalise the banks can best be understood not as creeping socialism, as his 
conservative opponents argued, but a modest proposal to regulate credit that owed 
more to Maynard Keynes than to Karl Marx (May 1968; Kuhn 1986, 138–40). As the 
Australian economy became increasingly integrated into the world economy in the 
1960s and 1970s, Labor embraced the thrust of a Report by Alf Rattigan, who had 
been appointed to chair the Tariff Board by the Menzies Government, and cut tariffs 
in 1973 by 25%. And Labor pioneered monetarism in the 1975 budget, paving the 
way for the obsession with budget surpluses that remained a staple of Labor 
 
 
 
4 We owe the general thrust of this paragraph to an anonymous referee. 
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and Coalition economic policy until the economic crisis that began in 2008. (Whitwell 
1986, 53–79, 216; Kuhn 1988). 
Labor’s policies have changed, sometimes in quite important ways, but these 
changes reflect less a shift from radicalism to moderation, as suggested by Maddox, 
than shifts in the requirements of capital accumulation. Constant throughout, 
however, has been a broad commitment to the interests of Australian capitalism. In 
periods of economic expansion, this has allowed scope for reforms that benefit 
Labor’s working class base; in periods of retrenchment, at least some of these 
reforms have been withdrawn. 
The Lab-Lib consensus has been as evident in foreign as in economic policy. 
While the bulk of the Party opposed conscription in 1916, resulting in the expulsion 
of Billy Hughes, the ALP was not opposed to Australia’s participation in the First 
World War and remained a supporter of the alliance with Great Britain. Labor 
endorsed the country’s entry into the Second World War, on Britain’s side, and the 
Curtin Government subsequently introduced conscription for overseas service. 
Curtin’s ‘call to America’ did represent a shift in Australia’s alliance strategy, from 
close relations with one major imperial power to another, but it was a shift deepened 
by conservative governments. From that point to the present, the Labor Party has 
been loyal to the US Alliance which remains a bi-partisan matter of faith. The 
Coalition and the ALP differed over the Vietnam War and the invasion and 
occupation of Iraq in 2003. But Labor leaders opposed Australian participation in 
these conflicts because, under pressure from below, they correctly regarded them as 
illconsidered, likely to weaken US power and therefore not in Australia’s ‘national 
interest’ (Kuhn 1997, 163–84; Crean 2003). 
The discontinuity thesis suggests that there has been a long-term evolution from 
left to right in the ALP’s policies and that this has constituted an abandonment of the 
great Labor tradition. This is inaccurate. Rather than there being a single ‘Labor 
tradition,’ which has been betrayed, Labor’s policies and practice have consistently 
reflected the interplay of the forces that make up the Party’s material constitution—its 
working class base, the trade union officials and parliamentary representatives, and 
the pressure on the Party’s leadership from the capitalist class and the state machine 
within which Labor’s parliamentarians are embedded and whose interests they 
promote. Tension between these various elements has given rise to factional 
disputes and, at times, outright splits. These factors have pushed the Party to the left 
at some points, to the right at others. 
We can use the evolution of Labor’s industrial relations policy since the 1970s to 
make this point clearly. In the early 1970s, the union movement was on the offensive 
(following account is based on Bramble 2008). The strike rate was at a post-war high 
and union membership was growing rapidly. The capitalist class, having lost its 
ability to use arbitration as a bludgeon to end strikes following the O’Shea dispute of 
1969, was on the defensive. In these circumstances, union leaders were in a strong 
position to place demands on the Labor Party and, in the circumstances of the post-
war boom, the Whitlam Government was in a position to oblige. Before taking office, 
Labor promised significant reforms not just for the working class but the union 
bureaucracy as well. 
Although the Government’s industrial relations bill was gutted by the Coalition-
dominated Senate in 1974, Whitlam’s legislation still protected union 
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representatives and members against victimisation, created a limited right of entry for 
union officials to workplaces, restricted the awarding of costs in proceedings under 
the Arbitration Act, and set up the Trade Union Training Authority (with a grant of $3 
million). The Federal government became a pacesetting employer, granting four 
weeks of annual leave, paid maternity leave, and one week of paternity leave. 
Further, the Government backed union claims at national wage case hearings and, 
on occasion, lent verbal support to unions during strikes. 
The onset of the world economic crisis in 1974 halted Labor’s program of 
reforms favourable to workers. Capital went on the attack, while unemployment 
undermined workers’ bargaining power. In 1975, the Labor Government introduced 
‘wage indexation’ which cut real wages and was continued by the conservative 
Fraser Government. 
By the early 1980s, the labour movement offensive and the post-war economic 
boom were well and truly over. The working class and union officials were now in a 
weaker position to place demands on the ALP. Nonetheless, they retained significant 
capacity to obstruct. The capitalist class looked to Labor to carry through a 
substantial restructuring of the economy in its interests and to use its links with the 
unions to do so with minimal resistance from the working class. This strategy took 
the form of the ALP–ACTU Prices and Incomes Accord which earned Labor an 
unprecedented level of business support in the 1983 election. 
The Accord committed unions to industrial peace in return for price controls and 
the maintenance of real wages ‘over time.’ In practice, control over prices was 
tokenistic, real wages fell, and the profits share of national income increased. 
Further, enterprise bargaining was introduced which traded off conditions for wages. 
Union density declined. 
Despite its negative consequences for unionmembers and workers in general, 
the Accord had advantages for union officials, especially those at the top of the 
movement. They had high-level access to ministers and were appointed to a range 
of positions on the boards of statutory, advisory and other government agencies. 
Trade unions received financial assistance from the Government to promote 
controversial changes to work practices (Bramble and Kuhn 1999, 20–55). The 
relationship between the parliamentarians and the union leaders changed again with 
the election of Kevin Rudd. After years of declining union membership and the 
erosion of union organisation in workplaces, by the early 2000s union officials had 
lost confidence in their ability to rebuild trade unions by leading struggles against a 
sustained employer offensive. They looked to the election of a Labor government to 
save them from the Coalition’s WorkChoices legislation. Labor’s opposition to 
WorkChoices was, moreover, a crucial factor in the Party’s victory in the 2007 
election. ALP publicity stressed the unfairness of the Government’s policies and a 
union campaign, co-ordinated by the ACTU, hammered the point home. The 
capitalist class, for its part, made strong representations to Labor in 2007 not to 
return to the traditional award system. Labor responded by developing the most 
right-wing industrial relations policy in its history, ‘Forward with Fairness,’ quickly 
dubbed ‘WorkChoices lite.’ Rather than boast of their good relations with union 
leaders, as Hawke had done in 1983, the new leadership team of Rudd and Gillard 
distanced themselves from the union movement (Shaw and Grattan 2007). 
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Labor’s rightward shift reflected its desire to reduce business hostility, to capitalise 
on the weakness of the ACTU and to take advantage of the absence of any 
alternative force that could mobilise working class opposition to WorkChoices. 
 
Continuity or Discontinuity? 
Let us now draw the threads of the argument together. The discontinuity thesis 
suggests that Labor has undergone a change in its material constitution and its 
policies and practice over the course of the past three or four decades. Some 
important elements of what made the ALP a distinctively workers party during the 
first half of the 20th century are certainly undergoing change, as the ‘cartel party’ 
proponents of the discontinuity thesis emphasise. Labor is now far more reliant on 
the state and big business for funds. The membership is smaller and less proletarian 
in character. Many local branches are moribund. The leadership is much more likely 
to come from the middle class and the Party and union machines, and is more 
deeply embedded in capitalist circles than hitherto. By the same token, it has 
shallower social roots in the working class. Labor’s core working class vote has been 
in slow, uneven decline since the 1970s. The union bureaucracy has less influence 
in the Party than in earlier decades. 
The Party is still, nevertheless, based predominantly on the working class vote 
and is led by trade union officials and their parliamentary allies, governing in the 
interests of capitalism. The union bureaucracy has not been displaced in the ALP, as 
the row in the NSW branch over the privatisation of the power industry during 2008 
graphically demonstrated. If branch membership is in decline, union apparatuses 
continue to provide the staff, money and materials for Labor’s election campaigns. 
Labor’s voting base is still disproportionately working class, and the Party is still seen 
by many class conscious workers as ‘their’ party. Reformist consciousness within the 
Australian working class is still widespread, and this underpins continuing support for 
the ALP. For example, in 2007 many Australian workers looked anxiously to Labor to 
save them from WorkChoices, as opposed to using their own industrial power to 
throw back the attacks. Although diminished, the features that led to the 
characterisation of the ALP as a ‘capitalist workers party’ are still in place. Labor is 
not simply a variant of the Liberal Party, distinguished only by a different marketing 
approach. 
Our review of Labor’s policy and practice suggests continuity rather than a sharp 
break with the past. Thus, Labor and the main conservative party in earlier periods 
agreed about protectionist and Keynesian economic policies, as Marsh has 
acknowledged (Marsh 2006b, 3, 7). Furthermore, the emergence of the neo-liberal 
consensus was already becoming apparent during the mid 1970s.5 This underlying 
continuity in policy is a result of Labor’s longstanding commitment to managing 
Australian capitalism. The particular form of Labor’s policies and practice has varied 
over time, but particular instances of such change can be understood not as a 
‘betrayal,’ but a reflection of changes within 
 
 
 
5 Marsh variously dates the shift ‘from the late 1970s’ or ‘after 1983’ (Marsh 2006b, 3; Marsh 2006c, 
124–5). 
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the framework of Labor’s material constitution, specifically the relative pressure 
brought to bear on the Party by the working class and capitalist class mediated 
through the parliamentary and union leaderships. Just as there has been a shift to 
the right in Labor policies as the capitalist class’s influence over the Party has 
increased since the last major working class upsurge in Australia in the early 1970s, 
so renewed and sustained working class mobilisation may see Labor’s policies or 
those of a substantial section of the Party shift back to the left again, albeit within the 
confines of its reformist outlook and ambitions. 
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